We study the impact of finite-size effects on the security of thermal one-way quantum cryptography. Our approach considers coherent and/or squeezed states at the preparation stage, on the top of which the sender adds trusted thermal noise. We compute the key rate incorporating finite-size effects, and we obtain the security threshold at different frequencies. As expected finite-size effects deteriorate the performance of thermal quantum cryptography. Our analysis is useful to quantify the impact of this degradation on relevant parameters like tolerable attenuation, transmission frequencies at which one can achieve security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] lets two authorized users (Alice and Bob) to establish unconditionally secure communication over an insecure quantum channel controlled by an eavesdropper (Eve). After having shared a secret key, the users can employ it in a onetime pad protocol. To implement the key distribution, the sender (Alice) sends non-orthogonal quantum states to the receiver (Bob) through the communication channel. In this way, the parties can detect Eve's intrusions to gain information. The absolute privacy of the communication is established post-processing the raw key by classical protocols of error correction and privacy amplification, which reduce Eve's information on the final key to a negligible amount.
Protocols using continuous variable (CV) systems [3, 4] have been proposed for point-to-point one-way communication, exploiting squeezed states [5, 6] , finite alphabets [7] [8] [9] [10] , Gaussian [11] and non Gaussian post-selection [12] . Schemes based on Gaussian modulations of coherent states have been investigated in great detail [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , and we have now also experimental implementations over long distances [20] [21] [22] . Besides one-way protocols, it has been proposed to exploit two-way communication [23] [24] [25] , quantum illumination [26] , floodlight QKD [27] [28] [29] [30] , and measurement-device-independence (MDI) [31, 32] , the latter very promising to establish end-to-end communications [33, 34] . In particular CV-MDI protocols are very promising for future implementation of highrate metropolitan networks, or for multi-users quantum conferencing [35] .
Thermal QKD has been investigated in both one-way [36, 37] and two-way [38] configuration, with the goal of exploring the possibility of implementing QKD at frequencies alternative to the optical one. Initially, the use of thermal states in the optical regime was proposed to describe imperfections in the preparation of coherent states due to the use of cheap thermal sources [39, 40] . In thermal protocols, the coherent-state based encoding is replaced by the Gaussian modulation of thermal states, prepared by adding trusted noise on top of coherent states. The analysis of the performance at various frequencies is carried out by expressing the trusted noise in terms of the thermal photon number of the background radiation.
The increasing attention received by CV-QKD in recent years is justified by the relative simplicity of the experimental setup, and the very high key-rate achievable, which can be close to the secret-key capacity of an optical communication channel, also known as PLOB bound [41] [42] [43] . Moreover, the possibility of implementing communications exploiting all the electromagnetic spectrum represents an additional appealing feature of CV systems. The progress achieved in recent years on the security proofs of Gaussian CV-QKD, has led to establish composable security proofs for coherent-state oneway protocols [44, 45] and MDI schemes [46] . An important scenario to consider, when we study the security of CV-QKD in practical conditions, is to quantify the security performances of a protocol when finite-size effects are incorporated in the analysis. The study of finite-size effects is a precursory step in the security analysis of both one-way [47] and MDI schemes [48] .
Previous studies of thermal protocols have only considered ideal asymptotic conditions, where the parties exchange infinitely many signals over the quantum channel. This is a powerful assumption that simplifies the mathematical complexity of the security analysis: One can work within the Devetak-Winter security criterion [49] and use the Holevo quantity [50] to bound Eve's accessible information. The study of security under more practical conditions requires to assume that Alice and Bob can only make a finite use of the communication channel. This introduces finite-size effects that deteriorate the performance, reducing the tolerable excess of noise, lowering the key rate and shortening the achievable distances.
In this work, we study the impact of finite-size effects on the security of thermal one-way protocol, adapting the approach described in Ref. [51] for coherent state CV QKD. This allows us to quantify the performance of thermal QKD under more realistic assumptions than in previous studies. We focus on one-way schemes used in direct reconciliation (DR) because this represents the configuration providing the best performance for Gaussianmodulated thermal-state quantum cryptography. The performances are then limited, by construction, to 3 dB
We systematically analyze the impact of finite-size effects on the performance of thermal one-way quantum cryptography in various decoding configurations (homodyne and heterodyne detections), which may be employed in short to mid-range communication, if one assumes to use optical fibers. Our analysis also shows that the parameter estimation procedure is negatively affected by the use of trusted thermal noise, which can further degrade the achievable distances. We also show that using thermal states, generated starting from moderately squeezed ones within state-of-the-art experimental equipment (e.g., 10 dB of squeezing), can provide an incremental improvement of the achievable distance which saturates for higher squeezing factors. Finally, we study the impact of the finite-size effects on the threshold of a protocol operating in the microwave regime.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section II describes the protocol, including the optimal attack. In Section III, we focus on the case where Bob's decoding is performed by randomly switching the homodyne detection between the two possible quadratures (switching protocol). The discussion of other cases (no-switching protocol and encoding based on squeezed-thermal states, rather than coherent-thermal ones) is given in the Appendices. In Section IV, we describe the steps to compute the secret key rate incorporating finite-size effects. In Section V, we give the results of our analysis, and discuss the performance of the switching protocol in terms of the achievable distance in the optical regime, and the security threshold at various frequencies. Finally, Section VI is left to our conclusions.
II. PROTOCOL AND EAVESDROPPING
We now describe the one-way thermal QKD protocol in the prepare and measure (PM) representation. Additional details on thermal QKD can be found in Ref. [36] [37] [38] [39] 52] and in the recent review of Ref. [40] . The general bosonic mode of the electromagnetic field can be described in terms of its quadratures, Q and P , defined as Q := a † + a and P := i a † − a . We remark that we assume unit vacuum shot-noise units (SNU) and, from quadratures Q and P we define the vectorial operator
The one-way communication goes as follows (see Fig. 1 ): Alice prepares thermal states and modulates them by applying random displacement in the phase space, according to a bivariate Gaussian distribution. We notice that the sender can prepare thermal states starting from coherent or squeezed states. We then have that Alice's input mode, A, can be described by the following input quadrature X A The initial mode A is in a thermal state with variance V th + Vs and modulate dwith variance VM . After mode A is sent through the channel, Bob receives mode B and applies a homodyne detection on either q-or p-quadrature or a heterodyne detection measuring q and p-quadrature at the same time. The thermal-loss channel is modelled by a beam splitter with transmissivity τ . The Gaussian eavesdropping takes the form of an entangling cloner attack, where Eve's system is described by the modes e and E in an TMSV state with variance ω. According to this description, an optical fiber is simulated with transmissivity τ = 10
10 , where d (in km) is the length of the fiber, and excess noise variance Vε = τ ε, where ε =
where X s describes the quantum fluctuations of the initial coherent or squeezed state from which the sender starts, X th is the contribution from trusted thermal noise, while X M describes the Gaussian encoding. It is easy to see that the resulting input variance, describing the input mode, is given by the following simple relation
where V M > 0 and V th > 0, and V s = 1 if the sender starts from coherent states. In the next stage of the protocol, mode A is affected by a thermal-loss channel. The output mode B is then measured by Bob who can perform homodyne (switching protocol) or heterodyne detections (no-switching). The optimal eavesdropping of CV one-way protocols after de Finetti reduction [45, 53] of general attacks, is a single-mode Gaussian collective attack [54] [55] [56] , completely characterized in [57] . Thermal-loss channels, like free-space and optical fiber communications, can be dilated into entangling cloners, consisting of a beam splitter with transmissivity τ , placed between the parties. This device receives the incoming signal-mode A and Eve's ancillary mode E (see Fig. 1 ). Eve's modes E and e are in a two-mode squeezed vacuum state (TMSV) ρ eE which is a zero-mean Gaussian state [3] described by the covariance matrix (CM)
with variance parameter ω ≥ 1. The output modes E ′ and e are then stored in a quantum memory that is op-timally measured by the eavesdropper after the parties have concluded the communication stage. In order to quantify Alice-Bob mutual information and Eve's accessible information, one needs to compute Bob's output mode B (see Fig. 1 ) which is described by the following vectorial operator
where X 0 describes Eve's vacuum mode having variance V 0 = 1, and the term X ε describes the excess of noise on the channel, conventionally defined as ε := (1 − τ )(ω − 1)/τ [13] . It is easy to check that the variance of X B can be written as
with variances V M ≥ 0, V th ≥ 0, V s ≤ 1, where all noise contributions are grouped in the term
and where we have defined the variances of the excess noise as V ε := τ ε [51] and V := V th + V s − 1.
III. SWITCHING PROTOCOL WITH THERMAL STATES FROM MODULATED COHERENT STATES
We now consider a specific implementation: Alice starts preparing Gaussian-modulated coherent states, adds trusted thermal noise, and sends the resulting signals to Bob who, at random, switches his detection setup between homodyne measurements on Q or P (switching protocol). We discuss here only the direct reconciliation (DR), i.e., Bob infers Alice's encoded state from the outcomes of his detections.
With Alice starting from coherent states, one has the shot-noise variance V s = 1, so that V = V th . In such a case, Eq. (6) reduces to the simpler expression
We notice that, despite DR can only tolerate a maximum of 3 dB of channel's attenuation, in case of thermal oneway QKD, it does much better than the RR, which has been showed to tolerate only a small amount of thermal noise [38] .
A. Mutual information
From the variances of Eq. (5) and Eq. (7), we compute Alice-Bob mutual information
with H B (H B|α ) being Bob's total (conditional) Shannon entropy [58] . In particular, we may write
where V B is the variance of Bob's output signal while
N is Bob's variance conditioned to Alice's preparation. Therefore, using Eq. (5) and Eq. (7) we obtain the following general expression for Alice's Bob mutual information
B. Key rate
Under ideal conditions of infinite number of channel uses, we can write the Devetak-Winter rate [49] R :
where Eve's accessible information, I E , is computed with the Holevo function [50] . In DR the quantity I E is given by
where S eE ′ and S eE ′ |α describe the total and conditional von Neumann entropies of the output states ρ eE ′ and ρ eE ′ |α . For Gaussian states, the von Neumann entropies are completely determined by their CMs V eE ′ and V eE ′ |α taking the following simple form [3]
where the entropic function h(.) is defined as
and ν i are the corresponding symplectic eigenvalues [3] .
Moving from ideal conditions to realistic scenarios, the parties extract a usable key from a finite number of uses of the quantum channel. This generally deteriorates the performances because the efficiency of the classical protocols of error correction and privacy amplification is reduced, as well as the accuracy of the channel parameter estimation. A first adjustment to the key-rate of Eq. (11) incorporates the efficiency of classical protocols, and is given by the following key rate
with efficiency ξ ≤ 1. We remark that the design of efficient classical error correction codes, such that ξ ≃ 1 is non-trivial, but recent progress [59, 60] showed that efficiencies as large as ξ ≃ 0.98, or more, are achievable today. For this reason this imperfection should not be considered as a major bottleneck for the development of CV quantum cryptography.
IV. FINITE-SIZE DESCRIPTION
The key rate R ξ of Eq. (15) clearly fails to intercept all finite-size effects which play a role in quantifying the parameters of the attack which, accordingly to the discussion in Sec. II, is quantified by excess of noise V ε and transmissivity τ . In this section, we quantify the impact of finite-size effects by adapting the approach described in Ref. [51] , which is fairly simple to generalize to the thermal case. We can define two statistical variables M i and B i , for i = 1, . . . , m, representing the realizations of the input X M and of the output mode X B of Eq. (4). The definition of the estimator of covarianceσ MB , between modes X M and X B , is then easy to define as followŝ
From Eq. (16) we can compute both expectation value and variance. Assuming M i and B i as independent and normally distributed Gaussian variables, we get the expectation value
and the variance
Similarly, we can obtain expectation value and variance of the estimator,τ , of the transmissivity τ . From Eq. (17), one then writeŝ
where
is chi-squared distributed.
From Eq. (19), we can compute the following expectation value
having confidence interval quantified by variance
The same steps can be made to obtain the variance V N starting from the statistical sampling B i and M i . Using Eq. (5) we can write the estimatorV N as followŝ
It is clear from Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) that the standard deviation στ becomes rapidly negligible as m ≫ 1.
One
is also χ 2 -distributed with expectation values m and variance 2m. We then can writeV
The estimator for the variance V ε , can now be expressed usingV N andτ . It is easy to check that one obtains the following formulaV
with expectation value
and variance
We remark that these equations are formally identical to the case described in Ref. [51] . The only but crucial difference, in our case, is the presence of the contribution from thermal noise V th , which appears in V . Assuming an error probability for the parameter estimation of the order of ε P E = 10 −10 , we can associate confidence intervals of 6.5-sigmas which allow us to write the values of transmissivity and excess noise as
The quantities in Eq. (25) are then used to compute the finite-size key rate, which is given by the following expression
whereN = n + m, is the total number of signals points, n is the number of signals used to build the key, and the correction term ∆ accounts for the penalty for using the Holevo bound in the key rate of Eq. (26) using a finite number of signals. (Its description can be found in [47, 51] ).
V. PERFORMANCES AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the performance of finitesize thermal one-way QKD DR. The results are obtained numerically, evaluating the key rate of Eq. (26) , and quantifying relevant quantities like achievable distance, block-size dimensions needed to obtain a positive key or to recover the asymptotic key rate, and the finite-size performances of thermal QKD at different frequencies. The red solid curve describes the ideal key-rate, using just coherent states. The blue-dashed curve describes the ideal key rate assuming a preparation noise with variance V th = 9 SNU. Then, we keep the same V th and plot the finite-size rate for block size with N = 10 9 (black dashed line) andN = 10 7 (gray dashed) with ξ = 0.98 and ω = 1. The key rate is optimized over the Gaussian modulation VM . The right panel presents the key rate as a function of the block size (N ). We fix channel attenuation to 1 dB, and we assume pure loss attack ω = 1 while ξ = 0.98. The plot shows the convergence of the key rates toward the asymptotic values (dashed curves) for different values of the preparation noise V th = 0, 1, 10, 100, 150 SNU, from top to bottom.
A. Secret key rate for different block sizes in the optical regime
Here we focus on the size of the signal blocks needed in order to achieve a positive key rate in the presence of increasing thermal noise. We use the average values τ ≃ τ and V ε = V ε for which one can write V ε = τ ε, with ε = [(1 − τ )ω − (1 − τ )] /τ . The parameter ω represents the variance of thermal noise of Eve's ancillary states used in the attack. We write the transmissivity τ in terms of dB of attenuation defining τ = 10 − dB 10 and we express the key rate as follows (27) where r := m/N . From Eq. (27) we can plot the key rate as a function of the channel attenuation, fixing the values of V th , efficiency ξ, thermal noise ω, and shot-noise variance V s . Then we can optimize over the remaining parameters. The results for pure-loss attacks are shown in Fig. 2 . In the left panel we plot the key rate for different values of the block-size and preparation noise. In particular, the red solid line describes the asymptotic key rate when Alice send coherent states, i.e., V th = 0, while the blue-dashed line is for V th = 9 SNU. Then, we compare the previous curves with the key rate of Eq. (27) for N = 10 9 (black dashed line) andN = 10 7 (gray dashed line).
In Fig. 2 (right panel) , we quantify the block-size needed to achieve a positive key rate for increasing values of the preparation noise. We fix the attenuation to 1 dB 
= 10
−1 , i.e., Alice's encoding is performed by adding thermal noise on moderate squeezed states. We notice that in such a case the achievable distance is only incrementally improved. Moreover the performance of the protocol saturates for stronger initial squeezing, i.e. for V and assume pure loss attack (ω = 1 SNU). We then plot the key-rate as a function of the block-size, for preparation noise V th = 0, 1, 10, 100, 150 SNU from top to bottom and efficiency ξ = 0.98 [59] . Our results show that, by an increase in V th , the block-size need to be increased in order to match the asymptotic value of the key rate (dashed lines).
Finally Fig. 3 compares the key rate of the switching protocol when Alice start from coherent states (red solid line) with the case where she start from squeezed states. To distinguish between these two cases Eq. (6) splits as follows
and we recover Eq. (6). This case is described by the red line in Fig. 3 , while the others lines describe the cases V (blue-dashed) and V (q) s = 10 −5 (green). We see that using squeezed states can only incrementally increase the achievable distances, which saturates as the degree of squeezing increases. 
B. Security thresholds with finite-size effects at different frequencies
In order to study the performance of the protocol at different frequencies, we follow the approach used in [36, 38] . We rewrite the preparation noise variance V th ≥ 0, as
where the average thermal photon numbern is given by the Planck's formulā
at temperature T . The quantity h is Planck's constant, k B is Boltzmann's constant, and f represents the frequency of the signals. Therefore, the shot-noise level of Bob's detectors operating in the microwave regime will be different from the shot noise level in the optical regime, which is equal to 1 in vacuum shot-noise units. This shot noise will be given with respect to Alice's thermal mean photon number and will lead to an entangling cloner attack with ω = V th + 1. Assuming room temperature of T = 300 Kelvin and replacing ω = V th + 1, we can rewrite the key rate K as function of frequency f and transmissivity τ . The corresponding threshold of the rate for different block sizes is illustrated in Fig. 4 and shows that, in the microwave region, security is achieved only for transmissivities very close to τ = 1 for a moderately high block size number of N = 10 9 .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the security of thermal oneway quantum cryptography, including finite-size effects. These are evaluated adapting the estimation theory developed in Ref. [51] suitably extended to the case of thermal protocols. We focused on the protocol used in direct reconciliation because it is known that one-way protocols in reverse reconciliation cannot work at micro-wave frequencies.
Our analysis confirms that implementing CV-QKD with Gaussian modulated thermal states is challenging, and we cannot achieve long distance communications when we move away from a pure-loss attack scenario. When thermal noise increases (for instance V th > 10) both key rate and achievable distance rapidly deteriorate. This is caused by the role of the preparation noise variance V th on the confidence interval. In fact, the use of large amount of trusted noise, spreads the confidence intervals reducing the transmissivity and increasing the noise to be considered. This determines a degradation of the performance, which can only be balanced by increasing the block-size. This degradation rapidly worsening when the protocol is operating in the microwave regime since in such a case the typical detector's shot-noise implies an entangling cloner attack with too high thermal noise.
Finally we remark that alternative approach, based on schemes exploiting post-selection and two-way communication might be more effective in the thermal regime. This will be investigated in future works.
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Appendix A: No-switching protocol
In this appendix, we focus on the no-switching protocol studying both DR and RR. The description of the statistical estimators for the no-switching protocol is clearly analogous to that described in the main text for the switching protocol. For the no-switching scheme, we build two estimators, one for each quadrature q and p. The optimal estimators of transmissivity and excess of noise are then computed by combining them in the optimal linear combination.
Let B ′ describing Bob's output after the fifty-fifty beam splitter.
The vectorial quadrature
T has entries given by
where q vac and p vac describe the contributions from the vacuum mode mixed with mode B at the final beamsplitter. From Eq. (5), one can write the variances of mode B as follows
In the general case, where Alice starts from squeezed states, the noise contributions are given by the expressions
One can write the following output quadratures of mode B
where q N ′ and p N ′ are given by
These have variances
and where
If Alice uses coherent states V s = 1, the previous formulas simplify to the following expressions
The covariance between the input and output mode, for quadratures q M and q B ′ , is given by
We can build the following statistical estimator
compute its expectation value, obtaining
Then, assuming that q M and q N ′ are independent variables, with zero mean, we obtain the following expression for the estimator of the transmissivitŷ τ = 2σ
is chi-squared distributed. Therefore, the expectation value is given by
For m ≫ 1, we neglect terms proportional to 1/m 2 and write the variance ofτ as follows 
It is clear that repeating these steps for quadraturep B , we get
where the difference from σ 
The same steps provide the expression of the variance for quadrature p B which is 
and from Eq. (A30) and Eq. (A31), we obtain 
Now, assuming the general case of moderately squeezed initial states, we can write the confidence intervals which are taken [51] as follows
V up ε =V ε + 6.5s nsw (τ ,V ε ), (A35) assuming an error probability for the parameter estimation of the order of ε P E = 10 −10 .
Finally, proceeding as in Sec. V B, we can write a key rate of the form
where the rateR ξ given by the following expressioñ
whereĨ
and the expression of the Holevo functionχ depends on the implementation of the no-switching protocol, i.e., if the parties use direct or reverse reconciliation.
